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Abstract
Although anxiety is not necessarily a pathological phenomenon, it can become dysregu‐
lated,  causing  suffering.  Indeed,  emotion  dysregulation  lies  at  the  core  of  many
psychopathologies.  Thus, anxiety regulation is central to all  effective psychological
treatment. The predominant perspective on emotion regulation and dysregulation is
appraisal theory, which proposes that the cognitive appraisal of an event generates an
emotional response. According to Gross’s process model,  any emotion can become
dysregulated when the patient lacks or fails to use an appropriate regulatory strategy.
Therefore, the clinician must teach the patient better regulatory strategies. The perspec‐
tive  we  put  forward  departs  from  Gross’s  model  based  on  appraisal  theory.  The
experiential‐dynamic emotion‐regulation model, EDER, grounded in affective neuro‐
science and modern psychodynamic psychotherapy proposes that (1) emotions precede
cognition (temporal and neuroanatomical primacy), (2) emotions are not inherently
dysregulated (they have specific properties of time and strength proportional to the
quality of the stimulus), and (3) dysregulation derives from the combination of emotions
plus conditioned anxiety, or from secondary‐defensive affects, both leading to dysregu‐
lated‐affective states (DASs). To regulate DAS, the clinician must regulate the dysregu‐
lating anxiety or restructure the defenses, which create defensive affects, and then help
the client to fully express the underlying emotions that elicit anxiety and defenses. In this
chapter, we specifically focus on dysregulated anxiety, its neural bases, and how to
regulate it according to the EDER model. First, we present hypotheses and data to show
the neural bases of anxiety. Then, specific strategies and techniques to regulate anxiety
are explained and clinical excerpts illustrate their application.
Keywords: anxiety, emotion regulation, affective neuroscience, psychotherapy
© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
We must study the mechanisms for regulating emotions when considering dysregulated
emotions and emotionally driven behaviors in conditions such as personality or anxiety
disorders [1–4]. The term emotion regulation refers to the neurocognitive mechanisms by
which we regulate the onset,  strength, and expression of our emotions [5].  According to
Gross’s process model of emotion regulation, emotions are generated through the following
sequence: (1) an individual, exposed to a situation engages with it; (2) attends to a particular
aspect of the situation; (3) interprets the event; (4) experiences an emotional response with a
feeling, physiological arousal, and adaptive action tendency; and (5) the individual modulates
that response.  In this model,  every emotion can in principle become dysregulated if  the
patient lacks or fails to use an appropriate regulatory strategy. Thus, the clinician must teach
the patient better regulatory strategies. Cognitive‐behavioral therapies (CBTs) follow these
principles (see Table 1). Most of these strategies act at the level of attention and cognition
and are consciously applied [4] by individuals to the experience of their emotions such as
fear, anger, or sadness.
Emotion generation and
regulation in normality
Emotion dysregulation in
psychopathology
Implications for treatment
Cognitive Emotion‐
Regulation model, CER
(Gross [5] and further
developments)
Cognitive appraisal produces
emotions. The individual
adopts cognitive top‐down
regulatory strategies at
different levels (situation
selection, situation
modification, etc.) to
regulate them
The individual fails to use
regulatory strategies (deficit
mechanism) and every
emotion can become
dysregulated
The clinician teaches the
patient emotion‐regulation
strategies (therapeutic
model: family of cognitive‐
behavioral therapies)
Experiential‐Dynamic
Emotion‐Regulation
model, EDER (Grecucci
[3]; Frederickson and
Grecucci [36]; Grecucci
et al. [4])
Emotion is automatically
generated by subcortical
structures with certain
properties (duration, intensity).
The brain self‐regulates
emotions through a biological
mechanism
After emotion is generated,
dysregulatory mechanisms
intervene that stop self‐
regulatory mechanisms and
cause dysregulated‐affective
states (DASs)
The clinician helps the
patient to remove
dysregulatory mechanisms
and downregulates DAS
(therapeutic model: family of
experiential‐ dynamic
therapies)
Table 1. Two models of emotion regulation (modified from Grecucci et al. [4]).
Experiments studying emotion regulation show that individuals can learn to regulate their
emotions, and their neural bases have been uncovered (see [6] for a review of basic findings).
Of these, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dlPFC, and the inferior parietal cortex, IPC, are
commonly believed to control attention and working memory [7]. The anterior cingulate
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cortex, ACC, is associated with monitoring and control of ongoing processes [8]. The ventro‐
lateral prefrontal cortex (v1PFC) appears to be responsible for selecting goal‐appropriate
responses [9, 10] and inhibiting inappropriate ones [11]. The target region of regulation is
commonly believed to be the amygdala, a structure that supports the elaboration of external
and internal emotional stimuli [12, 13] and negative stimuli [14].
In another line of research, Grecucci et al. [15–17] evaluated the regulation of socially cued
emotions in real interactions. These studies showed that mentalizing (reappraising the
intentions of the partner as less negative) changes emotional reactions, interpersonal behav‐
iors, and neural responses. The tasks used in one of these experiments were derived from
economic game theory (e.g., the ultimatum game and dictator game). One study showed that
participants had weaker emotional reactions, used less rejection behavior, and had less neural
activity if they downregulated their emotions while receiving unfair offers. This modulation
of emotion was visible in an area of the brain involved in aversive reactions elicited by unfair
offers, namely the insula. The insula has been found to represent visceral‐affective experience
[18–20], sensory experience [19], moral disgust, and anger [21].
A third line of research explored the interpersonal regulation of others’ emotions. In line with
[22, 23], we define this as regulation that occurs within interactions between two people.
Despite the relevance of this type of regulation for clinical situations, we found only one
attempt to study it in a laboratory setting. In a recent study [24], participants were asked to
regulate their own (intrapersonal condition) and other persons’ (interpersonal condition)
emotional states. In the interpersonal condition, participants watched videos of people
watching and reacting to the same emotional video they were watching. Participants were
instructed to tell the person in the video how to interpret (reappraisal strategy) or suppress
(suppression strategy) the emotional content of the video. Participants using interpersonal
regulation showed decreased activation of the insula, the temporal‐parietal junction, the
temporal pole, and the medial prefrontal cortex similar to previous studies on emotion
regulation of socially cued emotions [15, 17]. Despite methodological limitations, this study
showed that regulating others’ emotions interpersonally is possible.
1.1. Problems with cognitive regulation models
Cognitive theories of emotion regulation rely on the assumption that cognitive appraisals occur
before emotional reactions, an assumption not supported by several neuroscientific studies of
affect (see [25, 26], for a discussion). Emotion has a neurobiological primacy over cognition in
terms of temporal dynamics (emotional stimuli are elaborated a few milliseconds before
cognitive information [27]). The amygdala is activated and, in turn, activates the body before
a later signal goes to the prefrontal cortex. Second, emotions have a neurobiological primacy
over cognition in terms of anatomical circuitry, in that direct links exist between perceptual
systems and emotional structures but not between perceptual systems and cognitive struc‐
tures [25, 26].
Further, if cognition is primary, then cognitive strategies should be strong in the face of
secondary emotional responses. However, research findings show that cognition‐based
strategies are not fully available for regulating emotions when emotion activation is high. For
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instance, experiments of emotion-regulation choice (how we choose which strategy to adopt
in a given situation) [28] demonstrated that participants used reappraisal to regulate only low-
intensity emotional stimuli and used distraction for high-intensity stimuli. This result reduces
the importance of cognitive regulation strategies during stressful events that are more
emotional than experimental stimuli used in the laboratory [26]. From a neurobiological point
of view, a decrease in BOLD signal during induced emotional states in the prefrontal cortex
(known to implement regulatory strategies) has been reported [29, 30].
2. Mechanisms of emotion generation, regulation, and dysregulation
Following the appraisal theory of emotion [31, 32], Gross’ [5] emotion-regulation model holds
that the cognitive appraisal of an event generates an emotional response. Based on this theory,
cognitive-behavioral therapies focus on discrete cognitive, attentive, and behavioral factors to
foster emotion regulation. In this view, emotion dysregulation occurs due to the failure to apply
appropriate cognitive, attentive, and behavioral regulatory strategies (see [33–35]). Behavioral
strategies (exposure to appropriate situations or adaptive modification of the situation),
attentional strategies (increasing attentional flexibility or developing awareness to internal and
external situational cues), and cognitive strategies (cognitive restructuring) are applied.
In this chapter, we depart from appraisal theory and cognitive emotion regulation, and present
the experiential-dynamic model of emotion regulation [4, 36] that is grounded in affective
neuroscience findings [25, 37, 38] and modern psychodynamic and experiential psychothera-
py [39–43].
The experiential-dynamic emotion-regulation model [4] holds that events trigger (1) emotional
responses prewired at birth [38] with inborn adaptive action tendencies [44] and facial
expressions [45] which (2) precede cognition (temporal and neuroanatomical primacy) [46,
38]. According to neuroscientific research [25, 37, 38], emotions are automatically and implic-
itly generated by mainly subcortical brain structures with certain properties (duration and
intensity proportional to the event) to give a sense of what is happening [46]. In normal
conditions, the brain regulates emotions through a biological mechanism. They rise in intensity,
peak, and then go flat with a Gaussian-like shape once the emotion’s adaptive action tendency
has been expressed in adaptive action.
Once elicited, emotions have a duration and intensity proportional to the stimulus and
automatically self-regulate [26]. The conscious control or the use of a specific strategy is
therefore not required to regulate emotions [4, 36]. Emotions are generated, expressed, and
channeled into healthy actions and return to baseline [43] once the resulting adaptive action
has served its evolutionary function. Thus, emotions are not inherently dysregulated [36].
Dysregulation derives from the combination of emotions plus conditioned anxiety, or from
secondary-defensive affects, both leading to dysregulated-affective states (DASs). To regulate
DAS, the clinician must regulate the dysregulating anxiety or restructure the defenses, which
create defensive affects, and then help the client to fully express the underlying emotions that
elicit anxiety and defenses (see Table 1).
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But if emotions are not inherently dysregulated, what causes emotions to become dysregulated?
Dysregulation results from (1) emotions paired with excessive levels of conditioned anxiety
or (2) emotions that are triggered not by a discrete stimulus in reality but by an ongoing
defense [43]. For instance, a patient projects that the therapist is criticizing him (imaginary and
continual stimulus), and becomes afraid of the supposed criticism. Here, the patient is not
afraid of the therapist; he is afraid of the image he places on the therapist (his projection). Thus,
his ongoing anxiety results from his ongoing defense. Anxiety resulting from the defense of
projection would be considered a defensive affect. We differentiate defensive affect (response
to an imaginary stimulus) from true affect (response to a real stimulus).
The therapist following EDER model treats emotion dysregulation by applying experiential
anxiety regulation techniques so that feelings can be explored without excessive anxiety or by
restructuring the defenses that cause defensive affects. As a last step, the therapist helps the
patient experience the underlying emotion fully without excessive anxiety or defenses so it
can be channeled into adaptive action [39–43, 47]. Once the patient experiences his feelings
deeply and channels them effectively into action, they no longer trigger anxiety, defenses, and
symptoms instead (see [48]).
2.1. Why we regulate
Excessive anxiety causes painful physical symptoms due to activation of the somatic and
autonomic nervous systems [49]. It compromises higher brain functions due to the release of
neurohormones, which shut down the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus [43]. It triggers the
use of defenses that create the patient’s symptoms and presenting problems [33–35, 50, 51].
The compromised mental functioning and automatically triggered behavioral patterns prevent
the patient from seeing better options, thinking about them, or being able to act on them.
Excessive anxiety is a painful condition that Meltzer defines as unbearable mental pain that
the mind wants to get rid of [52]. Thus, anxiety regulation is essential for any change to occur
in psychotherapy.
To understand why and how anxiety is regulated in our brain and why “emotion regulation”
does exist in the brain, we use an analogy from statistical mechanics (see [3] for a complete
description). Statistical mechanics is the application of the theory of probability to the ther‐
modynamic behavior of systems composed of a large number of particles. This branch of
physics provides a model to link the microscopic properties of the individual elements to the
macroscopic properties of the system made by them. Since the brain is one of the most complex
systems in the universe (the brain is composed of 1012 interacting neurons), statistical mechan‐
ics can be fruitfully used to describe why and how mechanisms exist to regulate emotions. As
the Boltzmann distribution suggests [53], the probability (P1) that a system (the brain) con‐
verges toward a desired energetic state (E1) (affective state) is negatively proportional to the
temperature T1 (level of dysregulated anxiety) of the system:
1 ( 1/ 1)E TP Ke -= (1)
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In every complex system, given two states E1 and E2, respectively, associated with temperatures
T1 and T2, where T2 is higher than T1, the system will settle into state E1, where the temperature
is lower:
1 ( 1/ 1)
2 ( 2/ 2)
E T
E T
P Ke
P Ke
-
-= (2)
In other words, when emotion is activated, the mind can settle into that state (E1 with its given
T1). However, if emotion is associated with excessive anxiety (DAS), the temperature over‐
comes the threshold of tolerability (say E2 with T2, where T2 > T1) and must be downregulated
by the system. In our terms, for the brain to work, anxiety must be kept at acceptable levels
(temperature T1). The brain has several prewired mechanisms to self‐regulate our emotions
under normal conditions. However, if these mechanisms are interrupted by dysregulatory
mechanisms, such as excessive anxiety (DAS), the temperature of the system will exceed the
capacity of the mind to bear it. If this is the case, the system (in a state E2 with T2) will adopt
strategies to abruptly lower it (defense mechanisms in psychodynamic terms that lower
anxiety). However, the strategies to lower anxiety may have costs for the system (e.g., pro‐
gressive cognitive, affective, behavioral distortions, and consequent symptom formation). One
of the clinician’s tasks is to help patients to regulate anxiety so they can experience progres‐
sively increasing levels of emotions without relying on defense mechanisms that create their
presenting problems. After having examined why the brain needs regulatory mechanisms
(excessive anxiety is painful), and how this is possible from a complex system perspective (the
system constantly tries to move toward the lower energetic state), we focus on what is
regulated.
2.2. What we regulate: anxiety
Emotions are evolutionary products designed to prime adaptive action [38, 54]. They become
dysregulated by being paired with conditioned anxiety or they are created by dysregulating
defenses [43]. If the therapist downregulates anxiety, the paired affect will become regulated.
If the therapist restructures the defense that creates the dysregulated affect, the affect will
disappear. For instance, if a patient can see the therapist accurately, the feelings toward the
therapist based on the projection will disappear. After all, the defensive affects were an illusion
based on the illusion of projection.
When an objective danger is detected, fear arises [50] to motivate us to deal adaptively with
an objective threat. When a feeling arises, anxiety rises if it was dangerous to have this feeling
in a previous relationship. Thus, anxiety is a signal that a feeling is rising that is potentially
dangerous for this relationship [55]. All children in their development learn which feelings are
allowed in their primary relationships and which feelings make caretakers anxious [56], thus
threatening a relationship necessary for the child‘s survival [57–59]. To adapt [60], the child
learns to ward off emotions that would threaten the relationship [56]. Thus, whenever a
New Developments in Anxiety Disorders6
forbidden feeling arises, anxiety automatically signals danger [61]. The anxiety occurs out of
the patient’s awareness because it is generated nonconsciously in the brain [46].
The symptoms of anxiety in the body are created by the activation of the somatic and autonomic
nervous systems. These systems are activated principally by several subcortical brain regions
such as the cingulate and parahippocampal gyri, the amygdaloidal complex (the amygdala
and bed nucleus of stria terminalis), septal nuclei, hypothalamus, some portions of the
thalamus (inferior thalamic nuclei), and some parts of the basal ganglia [62]. Other brain areas
involved in the anxiety circuit are the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, hippocampus,
hypothalamus, prefrontal cortex, periacqueductal gray matter, and the locus coeruleus.
The amygdala plays a fundamental role in the experience of anxiety by evaluating the valence
(unpleasantness) and novelty of the stimulus [63–65]. We can divide the amygdala into three
neural subgroups: the antero‐central, the baso‐lateral, and the medial. The baso‐lateral group
connects with the prefrontal orbital and medial cortex in the frontal lobe, and the associative
cortex in the antero‐temporal lobe. It is also hardwired with the bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis, ventral hippocampus, and central amygdala. The antero‐central group is hard‐
wired with the hypothalamus and brain stem, including the parabrachial nucleus and the
solitary tract nucleus [64–66]. Recent research shows that activating projection neurons in the
baso‐lateral amygdala (BLA) increases anxiety, while selective activation of axons from the
BLA to the lateral central amygdala reduces anxiety. Activating the monosynaptic glutama‐
tergic projection from the BLA to the ventral hippocampus also increases anxiety [67]. Sensory
information enters the baso‐lateral portion, and then relevant information goes to the central
portion. The central amygdala modulates behavioral, physiological, and cognitive activity
through its connection with the cortex and the hypothalamus. The bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis, BNST, is responsible for linking anxiety to emotional stimuli. This area is connected
to the amygdala, hypothalamus, and parabrachial nucleus. Indirectly, it is connected with the
prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus, locus coeruleus, raphe nuclei, lateral septum,
and periaqueductal gray matter. The BNST can be functionally divided into the anterodorsal
(adBNST), ventral (vBNST), and oval (ovBNST) portions. Inhibiting the ovBNST, or exciting
the adBNST reduces anxiety. By contrast, activating the ovBNST and inhibiting the adBNST
cause anxiety [68]. Perhaps, in the absence of threatening stimuli, ovBNST is under the
inhibitory control of the adBNST, or the adBNST is uninhibited by the inhibition of ovBNST.
Inhibition of BLA neurons, connected to the adBNST, triggers anxious behavior. Conversely,
their activation reduces anxiety as does selective activation of axons terminating in the lateral
hypothalamus. The connection of the adBNST with the parabrachial nucleus mediates
autonomic responses of anxiety [68]. vBNST has both glutamatergic excitatory synapses and
GABAergic inhibitory ones with non‐dopaminergic cells in the ventro‐tegmental area (VTA)
[68]. Glutamatergic inputs trigger avoidance and anxiety; the GABAergic inputs produce
reward and reduce anxiety [69]. Glutamatergic vBNST cells show an increase of activity during
a foot‐shock session, while GABAergic cells are inhibited [70]. Septal nuclei in the anteromedial
portion of forebrain receive inputs from the hippocampus and amygdaloidal complex and
make synapses with the thalamus, hypothalamus, and brain stem. The septo‐hippocampal
system may mediate stress‐induced anxiety [71].
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2.3. Dysregulated anxiety
Emotions may be accompanied by excessive anxiety as a result of conditioning in previous
attachments. Anxiety becomes a conditioned response indicating that a rising feeling could
endanger a relationship [50, 58]. In turn, anxiety triggers defense mechanisms (cognitive
distortion, behavioral avoidance) that cause patients’ symptoms and presenting problems [72].
The combination of emotion and excessive anxiety creates a dysregulated-affect state [36]. An
internal feeling is perceived as a threat in a relationship. The somatic and autonomic systems
are activated [49, 54], creating symptoms of anxiety [49, 73]. This activation of the amygdala
occurs before the message gets to the prefrontal cortex and becomes conscious [37].
The amygdala activates the somatic and autonomic nervous systems, which create a variety
of anxiety symptoms in the body [42, 43]. When anxiety is discharged in the striated muscles
(somatic nervous system), patients experience symptoms caused by tension in the striated
muscles (tension in voluntary muscles, clenched hands, and sighing). When anxiety is
discharged into the somatic nervous system, it is at a healthy level, so feelings can be expressed
and experienced deeply [43].
Figure 1. Decision tree for anxiety regulation.
When anxiety becomes too high, it shifts into the parasympathetic branch of the autonomic
nervous system. Now, patients experience anxiety in the smooth muscles (nausea, diarrhea,
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migraines, sick to stomach, and need to use the bathroom), resulting in moderate DAS [74].
Hence, anxiety regulation becomes imperative [43].
When anxiety becomes even stronger, the anxiety is discharged even more into the parasym-
pathetic nervous system, causing cognitive perceptual disruption, due to hypoperfusion of the
prefrontal cortex (problems thinking, loss of reality testing, blurry vision, ringing in the ears,
dizziness, fainting, and blanking out) [43]. The clinician should stop exploring emotions and
regulate anxiety until it is discharged again into the striated muscles. See Figure 1 for a
summary of the proposed method (see [43] for a more detailed discussion).
When anxiety is too high, it triggers defenses, which can distort the perceptual/cognitive
processes. For instance, denial can prevent a woman from seeing the danger of remaining with
an abusive husband (“He didn’t mean it.”) Her defense prevents her from accurately seeing
the stimulus to her feelings. Or she might deny that she has any negative feelings toward him
for hitting her (“I love him.”). Here, the defense prevents her from seeing her responses to his
abuse, keeping emotions out of consciousness.
Likewise, defenses can prevent the patient from being aware of her anxiety and, thus, from
regulating it. For instance, a patient might ignore her anxiety (“I always talk quickly. I’m just
a fast talker.”). Unable to see her anxiety, she cannot regulate it. We might hypothesize that
defenses interfere with optimal communication between the prefrontal cortex and the
amygdala. For anxiety regulation to occur, the patient must be able to observe her anxiety (the
effects of the amygdala on the body). A recent study suggested that anxious behavior can occur
because reduced functionality between the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala can disinhibit
the amygdala [75].
3. Techniques to regulate anxiety
3.1. Problems with CBT techniques to regulate anxiety
Thinking can affect our emotions. But our emotional impulses can also channel and influence
our thoughts [25, 46]. While modifying emotions gives rise to changes in cognitions, working
primarily on changing cognitions may not necessarily cause a shift in emotion [25]. The CBT
framework fails to understand that most feelings are not triggered by conscious thoughts but
by nonconscious neural processes. In fact, most thoughts are defenses triggered by feelings.
Cognitive interventions ask the patient to cognitively manage emotions based on willpower
and repeated practice of a technique. The patient is being asked to consciously control anxiety
and dysregulated-affect states while not being helped to address the cause, the unconscious
feelings triggering the anxiety and defenses.
This problem results from the fact that CBT theory fails to recognize that core emotions (an
evolutionary response to environmental and interpersonal cues) trigger anxiety, based on
conditioned responses [55]. While anxiety can be regulated through attentive focus and self-
soothing, it will continue to be triggered each time feelings arise. Unless the patient is helped
to bear those previously warded-off feelings, the patient will not be helped to cope with the
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cause of his anxiety. In the following section, we outline regulatory strategies that are more
consistent with affective neuroscience and the nonconscious processes that create emotions.
The CBTs are based on the assumption that the therapist can regulate the patient’s anxiety.
Unfortunately, this assumes that the patient is relating to the therapist instead of a projection
placed upon the therapist. Just because the therapist wants to help does not mean the patient
perceives her that way. In fact, if the patient perceives the therapist as critical, this perception
will drive not only the patient’s resistance to therapy, it will increase the patient’s fear of the
therapist. Anxiety cannot be regulated and the impasse cannot be resolved unless the therapist
addresses the patient’s projection.
Another potential drawback of the cognitive‐behavioral framework is that techniques focusing
on positive reappraisal may encourage some patients to obsessively ruminate about the
thoughts that need reframing or pursue endless reframes without significant relief [76]. While
the third‐wave CBTs address this with cognitive defusion and mindfulness methods, this
assumes that conscious top‐down regulation can work with nonconscious bottom‐up activa‐
tion. See [4] for a more detailed discussion and a comparison between CBT and experiential‐
dynamic therapy (EDT) techniques.
3.2. Principles of experiential-dynamic techniques for regulating anxiety
Within the field of experiential‐dynamic therapies, true feelings are understood to be generated
through subcortical neuroperception of the environment, the experience of stimuli in reality
[25, 37–39, 41–43, 46, 54, 55, 77]. DASs are created through the pairing of emotions with
excessive conditioned anxiety or by defenses which create defensive affects [39, 41–43]. With
this dual theory of causation, we differentiate true feelings generated by real stimuli from
defensive affects generated by imaginary stimuli.
In the course of therapy, the patient describes relationships where his problem occurs. The
therapist explores the feelings triggered toward a specific person for doing a specific thing to
the patient. As feelings rise, feelings trigger anxiety and defenses. If necessary, the therapist
regulates anxiety and then explores the feeling. Otherwise, the therapist helps the patient see
the defenses that create his symptoms and presenting problems and then encourages the
patient to face his feelings rather than use his defenses.
Sometimes, anxiety can be regulated fairly easily by helping the patient pay attention to the
physical experience of anxiety in the body. Or the patient may be helped to feel less anxious
just by understanding the process of the session: as he explores his feelings, feelings trigger
anxiety, anxiety triggers defenses, and the defenses create his symptoms and presenting
problems. Understanding causality orients the patient, reducing anxiety.
Another way to regulate anxiety is to block defenses that perpetuate or escalate anxiety.
For instance, rumination about past events or future fantasies will perpetuate anxiety.
Blocking those defenses will block the rise of anxiety based on fantasies. Then, the thera‐
pist directs the patient’s attention to the feeling in this moment that triggers anxiety in this
moment. Keeping the focus in the here and now maintains an effective focus that will be
inherently anxiety regulating. The therapist needs to ask himself: (1) is the patient focusing
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on experience in the past, future, or present? (2) Is this a real stimulus or an imaginary
one? (3) Is this a specific example or a vague one? And (4) what is the patient feeling to‐
ward whom for doing what? To explore feelings and regulate anxiety, we need to examine
what the patient feels now regarding a real stimulus toward a real person for a real deed.
This clarity and focus is inherently regulating.
Every time anxiety moves into the smooth muscles or cognitive/perceptual disruption, the
combination of feeling and anxiety creates a DAS. The therapist stops exploring feeling and
regulates anxiety until it returns to the striated muscles. The feeling, without dysregulating
anxiety, is inherently regulated. If the therapist fails to regulate the anxiety until it is in the
striated muscles, the patient will suffer from more severe somatic symptoms and will shift into
more primitive defenses that lead to a loss of reality testing, which will perpetuate his anxiety.
While assessing the patient’s anxiety, the therapist will monitor how rapidly it rises, how slowly
it drops as a result of regulation, and the pathway of anxiety discharge in the patient’s body
(somatic or autonomic nervous system). This assessment allows the therapist to ensure that
anxiety has been regulated enough that it is safe to explore feelings to build the patient’s
capacity for affect tolerance.
Every story the patient tells triggers feeling and anxiety, allowing the therapist to assess what
issues and feelings trigger the most feelings, anxiety, and defenses. Obviously, whatever issue
triggers the most anxiety is where the patient needs the most help. Each time anxiety rises, the
therapist helps the patient see the issue he has, the anxiety it triggers in his body, the defenses
he uses, and how those defenses create the patient’s symptoms and presenting problems. If
the patient can observe his feelings, his anxiety, his defenses, and how those defenses create
his presenting problems, he can understand what causes his suffering and the therapeutic task:
let go of the defenses causing his suffering and face the feelings he has been avoiding.
When anxiety moves out of the striated muscles into the smooth muscles or cognitive/
perceptual disruption, the therapist should regulate the anxiety and then explore feeling
gradually, what we call the “graded format” [39, 40, 43]. In the graded format, the therapist
explores feelings gradually until anxiety moves into the smooth muscles or cognitive/percep‐
tual disruption. Then, he stops exploring feelings and regulates anxiety until it returns to the
striated muscles. Then, the therapist explores feelings again. Each time the therapist and
patient explore feelings at progressively higher levels until the patient can experience the full
extent of his feelings without his anxiety moving out of the striated muscles and without using
defenses that cause DAS.
We have described earlier how affects by themselves are not dysregulated. They are adaptive
responses that guide mammalian and human behavior, proportional to the stimulus. When
affects are dysregulated by excessive anxiety, we regulate anxiety and, thereby, end the affect
dysregulation. However, with mention of defenses that cause DAS, we shift to a second source
of dysregulated affects: affects that are triggered by defenses, what we call defensive affects.
Simply put, if a person criticizes you unfairly (real stimulus), you will feel anger toward that
person. However, if you imagine a person is critical and wants to hurt you (imaginary stimulus),
you will feel angry also. You would not be angry at what that person really did but at the
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projection you place on that person. Now your feeling results from a defense: projection. That
is why we call it a defensive affect. It is the result of an imaginary stimulus, not a real stimulus.
Likewise, you might become afraid, fearing at any moment that this imaginary critic will attack
you. This is not the fear of an objective danger, this is anxiety triggered by a projection. That
is why we call it projective anxiety [43, 78]. So, if you project that someone wants to criticize
you, you might become angry with that person or afraid of that person. In either case, the anger
or anxiety would be defensive affects, feelings that result from the defense of projection.
Let us clarify causality more deeply. A patient is angry with his boss. This anger triggers
anxiety. But he denies that he is angry and projects that his boss is angry with him. In response
to this projection, he becomes afraid of a supposedly angry boss. Now, anxiety regulation will
do no good. We can regulate anxiety that is caused by a genuine feeling toward a real person
for a real deed. But we cannot regulate anxiety that is caused by an ongoing projection. For as
long as he projects onto the boss, he will be afraid of the boss, or, more precisely, the projection
he places on the boss. First, we must help the patient see how he is projecting onto his boss.
What impact can this insight have on therapy? To deal with the anxiety of having feelings or
desires in therapy, the patient may project those feelings or desires onto the therapist. For
instance, an angry patient may project that the therapist is angry. The patient who wants to
look at her inner life may project that the therapist wants to look at her inner life. In each case,
the patient becomes afraid of the therapist’s imagined feeling or desire. This is projective
anxiety: fear of the projection.
The therapist cannot regulate a patient’s anxiety if the patient is projecting onto the therapist.
If the patient projects that the therapist is critical, a critic cannot regulate anxiety. The therapist
must deactivate the projection that is perpetuating the patient’s high anxiety. Once the patient
sees the therapist realistically, the anxiety due to projection will disappear. Then the therapist
can explore the patient’s inner feelings and desires she formerly projected onto the therapist.
The reader may be puzzled since it is well known that defenses are unconscious mechanisms
for avoiding forbidden feelings and the anxiety they trigger [50, 51]. Defenses are supposed to
reduce anxiety. That is true for some defenses. The EDER therapist focuses on the avoided
feelings that trigger the patient’s anxiety. If anxiety rises, the therapist knows he is approaching
the issues the patient avoids. Thus, anxiety is a good sign: the therapist is approaching
important therapeutic material. If anxiety becomes too high, it must be regulated. If anxiety
remains in the striated muscles, it does not need to be regulated.
When feelings trigger anxiety, patients use defenses to ward off feelings and the anxiety. For
instance, when the patient uses a defense, such as intellectualization, his awareness of feeling
drops and his anxiety will drop. If the therapist identifies the defense for the patient and invites
him to face the feelings underneath his intellectualization, the patient’s anxiety will rise because
the patient and therapist are going toward the avoided feelings that trigger anxiety.
However, certain defenses do not reduce anxiety. For example, the patient may project his
anger onto the therapist to avoid feeling it within himself. However, once he projects his anger
onto the therapist, he can become afraid of the therapist, resulting in even more anxiety,
creating a DAS.
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Suppose a man assaults a woman (stimulus in reality). This triggers anger (true feeling) in her
and, as a result, she is able to fight him off. However, in the therapist‘s office she is terrified of
the therapist, imagining that he is angry. She projects her anger upon the therapist (defense).
This defense of projection creates fear (defensive affect), the result of projecting upon the
therapist. Or suppose this patient criticizes herself for how she handled the assault. She turns
the anger toward the assailant onto herself (defense) and becomes sad (defensive affect).
Understanding what causes a given feeling allows us to intervene effectively. If the patient‘s
fear results from projection, we need to deactivate the projection [42, 43, 79] so that the anxiety
resulting from projection will drop. Here, cognitive and experiential-dynamic therapists agree.
Likewise, if the patient is sad due to self-attack, we need to help the patient see the defense
and relinquish it, so that her defense-caused sadness (defensive affect) will drop. Again,
cognitive and experiential-dynamic therapists agree.
Clinically, one form of dysregulated emotion is true feeling plus excessive anxiety paired
through conditioning. Classic anxiety regulation techniques shared by cognitive and experi-
ential-dynamic therapists bring the patient‘s anxiety down until the patient can bear her
underlying feeling without anxiety [39, 43, 79]. However, to prevent future relapse, a risk in
cognitive therapies (see [80, 81]), once the defense has been relinquished, experiential-dynamic
therapists will explore the true feeling underneath, which triggered the anxiety and defenses
[39, 41–43].
Unless the therapist builds the amount of feeling the patient can bear, DAS will occur with
each subsequent activation of feeling (see [82] for a review illustrating the relationship between
the degree of emotional experience and the level of long-term outcome.) To prevent further
DAS in the future, the experiential-dynamic therapist will explore the feeling at progressively
higher levels. Each time anxiety gets too high, the therapist will regulate anxiety (downregu-
lation), and then explore the feeling at a higher level.
In this gradual stepwise exposure method, the therapist builds the patient‘s capacity to bear
the full extent of her feelings without becoming dysregulated by anxiety or defensive affects.
In this model, excessive anxiety is determined by whether the patient‘s anxiety shifts into the
parasympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system (see [43] for a fuller discussion of
the symptoms, which indicate that the patient has gone over the threshold of anxiety tolerance,
and signs of cognitive impairment due to neurohormonal discharge).
This graded exposure to feelings helps the patient develop the capacity to bear her feelings
without anxiety, so she can channel them into effective action [40, 43]. Once she can bear her
feeling to the fullest extent, relapse into DAS can be prevented.
A second form of emotion dysregulation occurs when the patient‘s defenses cause a defensive
affect [39–43]. For instance, a patient who is irritated with the therapist may use the defense
of self-attack and become depressed in session. The therapist will help the patient face the
feeling toward him without using the defense of self-attack, which is causing the DAS. “If we
look under these critical thoughts, I wonder what feelings might be coming up here with me?”
The therapist helps build the patient‘s capacity to face and label her feelings without using the
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defense of self‐attack creating her DAS. See [36] for a more detailed discussion on how to deal
with DAS due to defensive affects.
Type of
affect 
Strategy Technique
Emotions Emotional
expression
‐Identify and label the emotions
‐Help the patient pay attention to the emotions in the body
‐Differentiate feelings from anxiety
‐Differentiate feelings from defense
‐Experience feelings physically in the body
‐Feel the impulse physically in the body
‐Portray the impulse
DAS due to
excessive
anxiety
Regulation
of anxiety
‐Identify the symptoms of anxiety in the body
‐Mobilize self‐observing capacity
‐Pay attention to anxiety in the present moment
‐Differentiate anxiety from the stimulus that generated it
‐Show causality: feelings in this moment trigger anxiety that triggers symptoms
‐Differentiate the symptoms of anxiety from the experience of feelings
‐Interrupt defenses that prevent anxiety regulation (ignoring, avoiding the present moment)
‐ Interrupt defenses that perpetuate anxiety (self‐attack, projective anxiety, symbolic
equation)
‐ Address spatial and temporal distortions
‐Shift the resistance system to isolation of affect
‐Restructure the pathway of anxiety discharge from the smooth muscles or cognitive/
perceptual disruption into the striated muscles (the graded format)
‐Interrupt projective anxiety
Table 2. Strategies and techniques to regulate anxiety in the EDER model.
When the patient responds with feeling, the therapist will encourage the patient to experience
her feeling more deeply, “How do you experience that anger physically in your body?” Or if
the patient becomes sick to her stomach (a sign of anxiety), the therapist will intervene
immediately. “That’s a sign of anxiety. If we look under the anxiety, could we take a look under
your anxiety and see what feelings are coming up here toward me?” If the patient becomes
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irritated toward the therapist and then shifts into a DAS of weepiness, the therapist will
interrupt the defense immediately causing her DAS. “Notice how these tears come in to wash
away your anger? Could they be making you depressed? Could they be protecting me? If you
don‘t protect me, could we look underneath those tears and see how you experience the anger
that‘s underneath those tears?”
In these examples, we see how different defenses create different defensive affects. We either
restructure the defense (e.g., projection) to eliminate the anxiety or defensive affects resulting
from projection, or we identify the defense (e.g., self-attack) and DAS and then help the patient
face the feelings which the defense and DAS are covering. In these ways, we build the patient’s
capacity to identify, experience, and bear her feelings without anxiety or defenses. Then, she
can channel those feelings into effective action so they can fulfill their original evolutionary
purpose: adaptation (see Table 2).
4. Conclusion
The EDER model presented in this chapter departs from other emotion-regulating psycho-
therapies (see, e.g., [34, 35, 83, 84]). One of the assumptions is that emotion activation is a
nonconscious physiological process that occurs initially without conscious awareness. The
brain is programmed to generate emotions in response to internal and external stimuli.
Emotions have physical properties with intensity and duration proportional to the intensity
of the stimulus. Emotions, as evolutionary products, are not inherently dysregulated. They are
activated so they can be channeled into adaptive action.
Moreover, emotion dysregulation is conceptualized as the result of dysregulating anxiety
and defenses, not by the lack or failure of regulatory strategies, thus departing from a
CBT view. From this perspective, dysregulation results from (1) emotions paired with ex-
cessive conditioned anxiety in the parasympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous sys-
tem and (2) affects created not by a stimulus in reality but by defenses such as projection
and self-attack. Frederickson and Grecucci [48] define feeling plus excessive anxiety and
feelings covered by defensive affects as dysregulated-affective states. DAS due to exces-
sive anxiety needs to be regulated [3, 4, 48]. If anxiety is too high, it impairs reality test-
ing, and cognition is impaired due to a shutdown of the prefrontal cortex. Once anxiety is
regulated and returns to the striated muscles and reality testing is restored, cognitive re-
working (in a psychodynamic or CBT fashion) can be done. We use two basic overarching
strategies: (1) emotion expression for true feelings triggered by real stimuli and (2) regula-
tion of anxiety (and restructuring of defenses) for DAS due to emotions paired with ex-
cessive anxiety (see [43], for more details). We then explore true feelings as deeply as the
patient can bear. The therapist upregulates true emotions while deactivating DAS until
the patient fully experiences the previously avoided emotions without the DAS caused by
anxiety (or by defenses). Now, the patient feels relief and can channel emotions into effec-
tive, adaptive action.
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